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YOUR GROUND LAWS ON VIOLENT 
CRIME* 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Empirical research has struggled to reach consensus about the impact of 
firearms regulations on crime.1 Consider, for example, the recent research on 
Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws that allow a person to use lethal force in self-
defense in places outside of the home without first attempting to retreat. Using 
repeated cross-sectional data on annual state crime rates, recent studies have 
examined the impact of these laws on murder and other violent crimes.2 
Unfortunately, this research has been inconclusive, with some studies finding 
positive effects, others reporting negligible or insignificant effects, and still others 
concluding that SYG laws decrease violent crime.3 Lott, for example, concludes 
SYG laws reduce murder rates by nine percent and overall violent crime by 
eleven percent, while Cheng and Hoekstra find that these laws increase the 
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 1.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 125-
51 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, How Do Right-to-Carry 
Laws Affect Crime Rates? Coping With Ambiguity Using Bounded-Variation Assumptions, 100 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 232–44 (2018) [hereinafter Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws]. 
 2.  See generally, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME 
AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (3d ed. 2010); Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense 
Law Deter Crime or Escalate Violence? Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 821 (2013); Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, 
and Injuries, 52 J. HUM. RESOURCES 621 (2017). 
 3.  Theory provides little guidance. These laws might deter some crimes if potential offenders 
perceive the costs of committing crimes may be higher. Yet, these laws may increase the lethality of 
criminal encounters. 
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murder rate by eight percent.4 As in many other areas of research on the impact 
of gun regulations, empirical results on SYG laws are highly variable and 
sensitive to minor variations in the data or the model. 
The fundamental difficulty in drawing inferences on the effects of gun 
regulations is that the outcomes of counterfactual policies are unobservable. 
Data alone cannot reveal what the murder rate in a state with a SYG law would 
have been had the state not adopted the statute. To address this selection 
problem, observed crime data must be combined with assumptions to enable 
inferences on counterfactual outcomes. Yet, the assumptions needed to identify 
these counterfactual outcomes cannot be tested empirically, and different 
assumptions can yield different inferences. 
In this setting, where the data alone cannot reveal the effect of firearms 
regulations on violent crime, it is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough 
to yield a definitive finding.5 When this happens, the effect of a firearms 
regulation is said to be point-identified. Researchers often recognize that these 
strong assumptions may have little foundation, but defend their strong 
assumptions as necessary to “provide answers.” However, strong assumptions 
may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions. We have seen this 
repeatedly in the empirical literature on the firearms regulations in general and 
SYG laws in particular. 
To focus attention on the sensitivity of inferences to the underlying 
identifying assumptions, we make two simplifying restrictions here. First, we 
examine only the effects of adopting SYG laws in a single year rather than at 
any point in time. In particular, to simplify the analysis, we draw inferences on 
the effect of SYG laws on average violent crime rates from 2008–2010 for the 
thirteen states that adopted these statutes in 2006. By focusing on the impact of 
adopting a SYG law in 2006, we do not need to make assumptions about how 
the effect of the statute varies with time.6 Second, we do not provide measures 
of statistical precision (for example, standard errors or confidence intervals).7 
Instead, we view the states as the population of interest, rather than as 
realizations from some sampling process. Thus, imprecision expressed through 
the width of the bounds only reflects the selection problem, not sampling 
variability. We do this to focus attention on the selection problem discussed 
above. However, even if we wanted to provide measures reflecting the 
 
 4.  See LOTT, supra note 2, at 333; Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2, at 849; see also McClellan & 
Tekin, supra note 2, at 849 (“[R]esults indicate that Castle Doctrine Laws increase total homicides by 
around 8 percent.”). 
 5.  See Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1; Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: Partial Identification Analysis Using Repeated Cross Sections, 29 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY, 29(1), 123-141, (2013) [hereinafter Manski & Pepper, Deterrence]. 
 6.  The effects of right-to-carry laws on crime, for example, have been found to vary over time. 
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1; see also John J. Donohue, Abhay Aneja & Kyle 
D. Weber, Right‐to‐Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and 
a State‐Level Synthetic Control Analysis, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198 (2019). 
 7.  See Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1, at 234–35. 
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uncertainty generated by sampling variability, it is not clear how to do so in this 
setting, where the state crime rate is the outcome variable of interest. The 
conventional assumption of random sampling from an infinite population is not 
natural when considering states as units of observation, and it is not clear what 
type of sampling process would be reasonable to assume.8,9 
With this in mind, we seek to make transparent how assumptions shape 
inferences on the effects of firearms regulations on violent crime. As noted 
above, the existing empirical literature provides no clear insight on whether 
SYG laws increase or decrease violent crime, which can in part be attributed to 
the varying assumptions made in the literature. This Article highlights the 
inherent tradeoff between the strength and credibility of assumptions and 
findings. To do this, we apply the partial identification approach developed by 
Manski and Pepper to re-examine the empirical analysis of the average effect of 
SYG laws on violent crime.10 These weaker, more credible models bound the 
average effect of SYG laws on violent crime, where the width of estimated 
bounds reflects the uncertainly resulting from the selection problem. 
We begin in Part II by demonstrating the sensitivity of inferences to the 
traditional models which have been used to point-identify the average treatment 
effect (ATE). As described above, the traditional approach for resolving the 
selection problem is to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive 
finding (that is, a point-identified average effect). However, these strong 
assumptions may be inaccurate, yielding flawed and conflicting conclusions; and 
we have seen this problem repeatedly in the empirical literature on gun 
regulations. In the analyses of SYG laws in particular, the traditional 
assumptions asserting that expected counterfactual outcomes are invariant across 
geography or time lead to qualitatively different empirical findings. 
In light of these conflicting findings, what credible conclusions about the 
effect of SYG statutes can be drawn from the empirical literature? At one 
extreme, some might take the variability as evidence that empirical results are 
uninformative. At another, some might argue in favor of a particular model, and 
draw conclusions based on that model. Yet, the model assumptions cannot 
 
 8.  See id.; see also Alberto Abadie et al., Finite Population Casual Standard Errors (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20325, 2014). In the setting of a randomized experimental design, 
Abadie and co-authors develop an alternative conceptualization for drawing inferences when one 
observes the entire population. However, their modified approach is not applicable in the more general 
observational data settings where the treatment—for example, right-to-carry laws—may be endogenous. 
 9.  In the panel data literature using annual state or county crime rates to infer the impact of 
firearms regulations on crime, some researchers report standard errors that allow for arbitrary 
correlation within at a state or county—so called state/county clustered standard errors—while others do 
not allow for such correlations. The publications by NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, and 
Alberto Abadie et al., supra note 8, show that these clustered sampling standard errors are generally 
inappropriate in the standard linear panel data models (with fixed state and/or county effects) used in 
the literature. Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1, argue that random sampling 
assumptions underlying these conventional approaches may not be justified. 
 10.  See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1. 
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generally be tested empirically and often have little foundation.11 If the 
assumptions lack credibility and consensus, picking a “winner” does not resolve 
the ambiguity. 
In Part III, we apply an alternative middle ground approach for drawing 
inferences under the weaker bounded variation assumptions developed in 
Manski and Pepper.12 The basic idea is to replace the assumptions of invariance 
across geography or time with weaker bounded variation assumptions. For 
example, rather than assuming that states with and without SYG statutes would 
otherwise have identical crime rates, we might instead assume these two groups 
of states are similar to one another. Likewise, one might consider the assumption 
that, in the absence of a SYG statute, these two groups of states would have 
experienced similar but not identical trends in crime rates. 
Bounded variation assumptions provide a way to relax the traditional 
invariance assumptions and improve the credibility of the empirical research on 
the impact of gun regulations. Manski and Pepper13 show that these assumptions 
partially identify the ATE, yielding bounds rather than point estimates.14 The 
basic insight is empirical results need not be an all or nothing undertaking. 
Available data and credible assumptions may lead to partial conclusions. 
In Part IV, we draw conclusions. Under very weak assumptions, the data 
cannot reveal whether SYG laws increase or decrease crime. However, under our 
preferred set of bounded variation assumptions, we draw substantive conclusions 
about the qualitative and quantitative impact of SYG laws on violent crime. In 
particular, we find SYG laws have modest positive effects on rates of violent 
crime and murder, and uncertain effects on robbery and assault. 
II 
INFERENCES UNDER POINT-IDENTIFIED MODELS 
In this Part, we demonstrate the sensitivity of inferences on the effect of SYG 
laws on violent crime, focusing on the types of point-identified models used in 
the literature. After providing a brief description of the data in Part II.A, in Part 
 
 11.  See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1. 
 12.  See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1. 
 13.  See generally id. 
 14.  Partial identification analysis of treatment effects from observational data was initiated in 
Charles F. Manski, Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects, 80 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 
319 (1990). For textbook exposition, see generally CHARLES F. MANSKI, PARTIAL IDENTIFICATION OF 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS (2003), and CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION 
AND DECISION (2007). For applications, see generally, for example, Brent Kreider et al., Identifying the 
Effects of SNAP (Food Stamps) on Child Health Outcomes When Participation is Endogenous and 
Misreported, 107 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 958 (2012); Charles F. Manski & Daniel S. Nagin, Bounding 
Disagreements About Treatment Effects: A Case Study of Sentencing and Recidivism, 28 SOC. 
METHODOLOGY 99 (1998); Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, Monotone Instrumental Variables: With 
an Application to the Returns to Schooling, 68 ECONOMETRICA 997 (2000); John V. Pepper, The 
Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Receipt: A Nonparametric Bounds Analysis, 82 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 472 (2000). See also Manski & Pepper, Deterrence, supra note 5. 
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II.B we examine the unconditional crime rates, and in Part II.C we estimate the 
types of linear regression models applied in the literature.15 
We consider the problem of drawing inferences on the effect of SYG laws on 
average violent crime rates in the 2008–2010 period for the thirteen states that 
adopted these statutes in 2006.16 The data reveal the annual crime rates from 
2008–2010 in the thirteen states that adopted SYG statutes in 2006, but do not 
reveal the counterfactual crime rate that would have occurred had the thirteen 
treated states not adopted SYG laws. To address the selection problem, we 
consider three different invariance assumptions that point-identify the 
counterfactual crime rate as equal to either: (i) the average crime rate in the 
thirteen treated states before 2006 (in 2000–2004); (ii) the average crime rate in 
untreated states in the contemporary post-2006 period (in 2008–2010); or (iii) the 
pre-treatment rate in treated states adjusted by the trend in crime rates in the 
untreated states, as would be the case in a difference-in-difference model. 
We conclude this Part by examining the pre-2006 data when the thirteen 
treated states did not have SYG statutes. Although the identifying assumptions 
cannot be empirically tested in the post-2006 period when the crime rates that 
would have occurred without SYG laws are counterfactual, they can be assessed 
in the pre-2006 period. For example, one identifying assumption holds that the 
effect of a SYG law can be identified as the difference between the crime rate in 
treated states post-2006 and untreated states post-2006. If this invariance model 
is valid in the pre-2006 period, the average homicide rate in states that adopt SYG 
laws should equal the average rate in states that do not adopt. After all, before 
2006, none of the states used in our analysis had adopted a SYG statute. Yet, the 
homicide rate in states that adopt SYG laws in 2006 exceeds the rate in non-
adopting states by as much as one and a half-points in the pre-2006 period.17 Thus, 
this contemporaneous invariance model is rejected in the pre-2006 period. In fact, 
all three invariance model assumptions are violated during this period. 
A. Data 
The crime data used in our analysis comes from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports.18 We use state-level data on annual 
crime rates (per 100,000 residents) from 1977 to 2010. For each state and year, 
we observe the overall violent crime rate and crime rates separately for murder, 
 
 15.  See sources cited supra note 2. 
 16.  The thirteen states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota. 
 17.  See infra Table 5. 
 18.  These panel data were originally assembled by John Lott and have subsequently been modified, 
corrected, and updated several times. Our analysis uses the iteration assembled and evaluated by Abhay 
Aneja, John J. Donohue & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: 
Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 565 (2011). 
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assault, and robbery. We also observe whether a SYG statute is in place.19 Our 
analysis uses the SYG adoption date data from Cheng and Hoekstra.20 
To illustrate the basic counterfactual outcomes problem, we focus on the 
impact of SYG laws in the thirteen states that adopted them in 2006. We refer to 
the states adopting SYG statutes in 2006 as “treated” states, and those that did 
not adopt them as “untreated” states. The eight other states that adopted SYG 
laws between 2005 and 2009 are excluded from the analysis.21 
Figures 1A and 1B display the annual time series of murder and robbery rates 
in treated and untreated states from 1990 to 2010. The figures reveal several 
interesting characteristics of the crime rates. 
First, murder rates in the treated states exceed the analogous rates in the 
untreated states. The opposite pattern exists for robbery. Second, the annual time 
series variation from 1990 to 2010 in crime rates for the two groups of states is 
similar, but not identical. For example, crime rates in untreated states have a 
more pronounced drop during the 1990s than those in treated states. 




 19.  There are significant differences in the definition of a SYG law within the literature. In 
particular, LOTT, supra note 2, studies primarily “Castle Doctrine” laws, which remove the “duty to 
retreat” from the home before using lethal force. Once these laws are passed, people are allowed to use 
force to defend their homes even if they could retreat from the home to safety. More recent papers 
consider a SYG law to be a law that removes the duty to retreat from somewhere outside of the home. 
McClellan & Tekin, supra note 2, consider any law that removes the duty to retreat from a public space, 
while Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2, consider laws that remove the duty to retreat from someplace 
outside of the home, which might include private property such as a vehicle. We use the classification 
reported in Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. Thus, the laws passed in thirteen states in 2006 that 
expanded the “Castle Doctrine” to someplace outside of the home constitute SYG laws for our purposes 
in this Article. 
 20.  See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. 
 21.  These states are Florida (2005), Missouri (2007), Montana (2009), North Dakota (2007), Ohio 
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Figure 1B. Robbery Rate by Year and Treatment Status 
 
B. Unconditional Analysis 
Consider the problem of using these data to draw inferences on the impact of 
adoption of a SYG law on the average murder rate in the 2008–2010 period for 
the thirteen states that adopted these statutes in 2006. Table 1 displays the 
average murder rate per 100,000 residents from 2000–2004 and from 2008–2010 
in the states that did and did not adopt SYG statutes in 2006. 
Table 1. Average Murder Rates per 100,000 Residents by Period and Treatment 
Status22 
 2000–2004 2008–2010 
Treated (in 2006) 6.94 6.17 
Untreated  5.16 4.52 
 
What do these data reveal about the effect of SYG laws on the 2008–2010 
murder rate in treated states? The average murder rate in the 2008–2010 period 
in the thirteen states that adopted SYG statute in 2006 equals 6.17. However, the 
data do not reveal the murder rate that would have been observed in the treated 
states had the statutes not been adopted in 2006, which is necessary to assess the 
impacts of these statutes on the murder rate. 
These counterfactual average murder rates can be estimated by comparing 
the 6.17 value to other rates presented in Table 1. Each comparison represents a 
different assumption and results in a different estimated ATE. Thus, our 
assumptions provide three different estimates of the counterfactual average 
murder rate: 
i. A before-after assumption uses the pre-period rates (2000–2004) 
among the treated states, 6.94, as the point of comparison; 
 
 22.  The treated group includes the thirteen states stated supra note 16. The untreated group includes 
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia. The eight states that adopted the SYG statutes between 






1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Untreated States Treated States
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ii. A contemporaneous assumption uses the contemporaneous rate in 
the untreated states, 4.52, as the point of comparison; and 
iii. A difference-in-difference assumption (DnD) adjusts the pre-period 
rate in the treated states by the time-series variation in the untreated 
state, 6.29 (=6.94-(5.16-4.52)). 
These data and assumptions result in estimated ATEs of -0.77, 1.66, and -0.12, 
respectively, and are summarized in Table 2. Table 3 displays estimates of the 
ATE of SYG laws on violent crime, murder, robbery, and assault under the same 
modeling assumptions. All of the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 are highly sensitive 
to the different modeling assumptions: depending on the model used, the 
estimates imply that SYG laws decrease, increase, or have almost no effect on 
murder rates, and have similarly variable impacts on other crime rates. 
Given certain assumptions, each estimate measures the effect of SYG laws 
on the murder or other crime rates. The before-after estimate is correct under 
the assumption that, except for the enactment of a SYG law, no determinant of 
criminal behavior changed in treated states between the early and late 2000s. The 
contemporaneous comparison estimate of the 2008–2010 rates is correct under 
the assumption that, except for the presence of the SYG statutes in the treated 
states, the populations of the treated and untreated states had the same 
propensities for criminal behavior and faced the same environments. The DnD 
estimate is correct under the assumption that, in the absence of a SYG statute, 
the treated and untreated states would have experienced the same change in 
murder and crime rates between the early and late 2000s. Thus, each of the three 
estimates can be justified by specific invariance assumptions. However, it may be 
that none of the assumptions hold and the variation in empirical findings shows 
that these invariance assumptions cannot jointly hold. 
Table 2. 2008–2010 Murder Rate for the Treated States Under Different Models: 
Observed, Counterfactual, and the ATE 
Model Employed Observed  




Before-After 6.17 6.94 -0.77 
Contemporaneous 6.17 4.52  1.65 
DnD 6.17 6.30 -0.12 
 
Table 3. Crime Rate ATEs Under Different Invariance Models 
Model Employed Murder Robbery Assault Violent Crime 
Before-After -0.8 -4 -27 -35 
Contemporaneous  1.7 -14  56  53 
DnD -0.1   9  18  27 
 
Importantly, these are more than contrived illustrations of the sensitivity of 
inferences to different assumptions. All three of these research designs have been 
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applied in the literature on the impact of SYG statutes, especially the before-
after and DnD models.23 
While commonly used, these invariance assumptions may not credibly 
address the selection problem. SYG statutes are not likely to be randomly 
assigned, as would be the case in a randomized control trial, and any imaginable 
comparison group is likely to differ in ways that may lead to spurious correlations 
in the observed data and biased inferences on the impact of firearms regulations. 
To address this concern, many of these studies (especially those using DnD 
models) use multiple regression models to statistically account for observed 
factors such as state demographics, socioeconomics, policing, other firearms laws, 
and so forth. In this case, researchers employ the conditional analysis approach, 
which assumes that an invariance assumption conditionally applies when 
statistically controlling for the set of observed covariates even if it may not apply 
when excluding such control variables from the analysis. Yet, the fact that states 
or time-periods with the same observed covariates have different firearms 
regulations suggests that confounding unobserved factors may play a role in the 
selection process even after controlling for observed variables. We consider the 
conditional analysis approach below in Part II.C. 
C. Conditional Analysis 
Some evaluations of SYG laws analyze crime data across many states and 
years and statistically control for a large set of observed covariates.24 Although 
these studies use additional data on SYG statutes, annual crime rates, and 
covariates, the empirical findings rest on similar if not stronger identifying 
assumptions. Data alone cannot resolve the selection problem. 
Consider, for example, the linear panel data models that rely on the strong 
invariance assumption that, after controlling for a set of covariates, SYG laws 
have the same effect on crime rates in all states and years. When combined with 
certain other assumptions, this homogeneity assumption point-identified the 
impact of SYG laws on crime. However, the assumption that the effects of 
firearms regulations are identical across states and time is not credible. For 
 
 23.  The before-after invariance model is applied in Mitchell B. Chamlin, An Assessment of the 
Intended and Unintended Consequences of Arizona’s Self-Defense, Home Protection Act, 37 J. CRIME & 
JUST. 327 (2014); Mitchell B. Chamlin & Andrea E. Krajewski, Use of Force and Home Safety: An Impact 
Assessment of Oklahoma’s Stand Your Ground Law, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 237 (2015); David K. 
Humphreys, Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Self-Defense Law on Homicide 
and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 44 (2017); Ling 
Ren et al., The Deterrent Effect of the Castle Doctrine Law on Burglary in Texas: A Tale of Outcomes in 
Houston and Dallas, 61 CRIME & DELINQ. 1127 (2015).  
 DnD invariance models are also applied in a number of papers. See generally sources cited supra 
note 2; see also generally Vincent Ferraro & Saran Ghatak, Expanding the Castle: Explaining Stand Your 
Ground Legislation in American States, 2005–2012, 62 SOC. PERSP. 907 (2019); Mark Guis, The 
Relationship Between Stand-Your-Ground Laws and Crime: A State-level Analysis, 53 SOC. SCI. J. 329 
(2016); Daniel Webster et al., Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law on 
Homicides, 91 J. URB. HEALTH 293 (2014). 
 24.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2. 
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example, the empirical literature on right-to-carry (RTC) laws finds that the 
effects of these laws vary over time and across states.25 
To illustrate how estimates from the linear panel data models can vary with 
data and assumptions, we use repeated cross-sectional crime data from 1977–
2010 to estimate a set of linear panel data models that differ in the underlying 
invariance restrictions, the time period used in the evaluation, the set of 
covariates, and the classification of SYG statutes. For each model, we present 
estimates for the log crime rate and the level crime rate. Much of the literature 
studies the natural log of the crime rate, where the estimates are interpreted as 
the effect of a SYG law on the percent change in the average crime rate. 
Following Manski and Pepper, our analysis here using the bounded variation 
assumption focuses directly on the state-year crime rates in which case the 
estimates are interpreted as the effect of SYG law on the average crime rate.26 
We also present results using two different sets of covariates applied in the 
literature on RTC laws. First, we use the control variables from Lott including 
detailed state race and age demographics, the arrest rate, the incarceration rate, 
median per-capita income, the poverty and unemployment rate, an RTC 
indicator, and state and year fixed effects.27 Second, we use the more 
parsimonious set of controls from Donohue and co-authors.28 In particular, this 
specification does not include measures of the arrest rate or the full set of age and 
race demographic control variables, but does include variables measuring the size 
of the police force. 
As with the unconditional analysis in Part II.B, the estimates from these linear 
panel data models vary with the particular form of the invariance assumption. 
Table 4A presents results restricting the treatment group to the same thirteen 
“treated” states that adopted SYG statutes in 2006 and the control group to the 
same “untreated” states that did not adopt a SYG statute used in Parts II.A and 
B.29 Most of the point estimates imply that SYG laws increase violent crime, but 
the estimated magnitudes are sensitive to the underlying identifying assumption. 
The first two rows in Table 4A present basic linear DnD results with different 
sets of covariates. The estimates displayed in Row 1, which use the Lott 
specifications,30 suggest that SYG laws increased the average murder rate by 9%, 
the robbery rate by 2%, and overall violent crime rate by 1%, but decreased the 
average assault rate by 1%. The second row, which reports results using the 
specifications from Donahue and co-authors,31 suggests substantially larger 
effects of SYG laws; SYG laws increased murder rates by 12%, and increased 
robbery, assault, and violent crime rates by about 5%. 
 
 25.  See generally, e.g., Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6. 
 26.  See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1. 
 27.  See generally LOTT, supra note 2. 
 28.  See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6. This is similar to the set of controls used 
in Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. 
 29.  The eight states that adopted SYG laws in other years, identified supra note 21, are dropped. 
 30.  See generally LOTT, supra note 2. 
 31.  See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6. 
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Table 4A. Linear Panel Model Estimates, 13 Treated States that Adopted in 2006 
 Murder Robbery Assault Violent crime 
Log Level Log Level Log Level Log Level 
DnD, Lott (2010) 
controls 
0.09 0.75 0.02 8.31 -0.01 3.68 0.01 12.13 
DnD, Donohue 
(2019) controls 0.12 0.39 0.05 17.15 0.03 -4.11 0.05 13.42 
Before/After, Lott 
controls 
0.12 0.79 0.09 11.04 -0.01 -3.45 0.03 11.85 
Contemporaneous, 
Lott controls 
0.06 0.32 0.21 9.39 0.17 48.13 0.15 60.91 
 
The final two rows in Table 4A present estimates for a before-after and 
contemporaneous identification strategy for the effect of SYG laws on crime 
rates. The before-after comparison uses only states that passed the law in 2006 
and compares the crime rates in those states before and after 2006, while the 
contemporaneous estimate compares crime rates after 2006 in states that passed 
a SYG law with the crime rates in states that did not. While these estimates 
generally imply SYG laws increase violent crime, the magnitudes vary across the 
two models. For example, SYG laws are estimated to increase the robbery rate 
by 21% under the contemporaneous invariance model versus a 9% increase 
under the before-after model. 
Overall, these results suggest that SYG laws increase violent crime rates for 
the thirteen treated states in the 2008–2010 period. However, there is substantial 
variation in the magnitude of the estimated effects. Depending on the identifying 
assumptions, the log crime rate regression estimates imply that SYG laws 
increase murder rates between 6% and 12%, robbery between 2% and 21%, the 
assault rate between -1% and 17%, and the violent crime rate between 1% and 
15%. 
Table 4B expands the treatment group to all states that adopted SYG statutes 
between 2005 and 2010.32 This replicates the basic models and time period 
examined by Cheng and Hoekstra.33 As in Cheng and Hoekstra’s article, the 
resulting estimates imply that SYG laws increase some crimes but decrease 
others. In particular, when using the covariates employed by Donahue and co-
authors,34 SYG laws are estimated to increase the murder rates by 4% but 
decrease the robbery and assault rates by 6% and 2%, respectively. 
Finally, Table 4C uses data from 1977–2005 to examine the effect of the 
“Castle Doctrine” laws, which remove the “duty to retreat” from the home 
 
 32.  These additional states are identified supra note 21. 
 33.  See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. 
 34.  See generally Donohue, Aneja & Weber, supra note 6. 
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before using lethal force.35 As with Lott’s findings, the resulting estimates imply 
that these laws decrease violent crime. In particular, the murder rate is estimated 
to fall by 4%, robbery by 2%, and assault by 10%. Finally, under this 
specification, SYG laws are estimated to decrease the overall violent crime rate 
by 6%. 
Table 4B. Linear Panel Data Model Estimates 2005–2010, Cheng and Hoekstra 
(2013) Replication36 
 Murder Robbery Assault Violent crime 









0.04 0.10 -0.06 -13.59 -0.02 -34.40 -0.03 -48.01 
 
Table 4C. Linear Panel Data Model Estimates 1977–2005, Lott (2010) Replication37 
 Murder Robbery Assault Violent crime 




-0.04 -0.49 -0.02 5.27 -0.10 -44.37 -0.06 -40.32 
D. Assessing the Invariance Assumptions Using Pre-Treatment Data 
One question to consider in light of the different invariance models’ estimates 
is whether a data-driven approach can determine if any of the identifying 
assumptions are valid. Although the validity of the different invariance models 
cannot be empirically tested, pre-treatment data can be used to assess the 
credibility of the assumptions. Here, we can compare the pre-treatment estimates 
of the crime rate implied by the invariance model with the observed crime rate 
in the thirteen states that adopt SYG laws in 2006. The invariance model, if 
correct, point-identifies the crime rate that would be realized if the treated states 
did not have a SYG statute. Pre-2006, the treated states did not have a SYG 
statute. Thus, if the invariance assumptions are valid in the pre-2006 period, the 
estimated rate of crime found under the invariance assumption will equal the 
observed crime rate in the thirteen treated states. If so, this finding may provide 
some heuristic support in favor of the invariance assumption. 
The crime rates displayed in Figures 1A and 1B provide direct evidence that 
the invariance assumptions do not hold across all years. All three of the 
invariance model assumptions are inconsistent with crime rate data pre-2006, 
 
 35.  These are the object of Lott’s analysis. See generally LOTT, supra note 2. The treated states for 
this analysis include Florida (2005), Illinois (2004), Colorado (1995), New Mexico (1978), North Carolina 
(1993), Utah (2003), and Washington (1999). 
 36.  See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. 
 37.  See generally LOTT, supra note 2. 
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before any state in our data set adopted a SYG statute. For example, consider 
the annual murder rates in treated and untreated states displayed in Figure 1A. 
While these states did not have SYG statutes prior to 2006, the murder rates vary 
over time and across the groups of states from 1990 to 2006. For example, in 2000, 
the average murder rate in the thirteen treated states is 1.2 points higher than the 
average rate in untreated states, nearly four points less than the average murder 
rate in treated states in 1990, and 0.03 points less than the rate found using the 
DnD invariance model. Thus, the strict invariance assumptions are violated in 
2000, before these states adopted SYG statutes. Moreover, the signs and 
magnitudes of these violations differ over time and across models. 
Table 5 provides additional evidence on these violations. For each pair of 
adjacent years from 1990 to 2006, we compute the differences between the 
observed crime rate in the treated states and the analogous rate found under 
three different invariance models. In Table 5, we display the maximum of the 
absolute values of these differences. So, for example, the before-after assumption 
is inconsistent with the observed crime rate in treated states by as much as eighty-
five crimes per 100,000 people for violent crime, one for murder, fifteen for 
robbery and sixty for assault. Thus, the invariance models evaluated in Part II are 
inconsistent with the observed rates in the pre-treatment periods. 
Table 5. Maximum Absolute Difference between the Observed Annual Crime Rate in 
the Treated States and the Counterfactual Estimate of the Crime Rate, 1990–200038 
 Murder Robbery Assault Violent Crime 
Before-After 1.0 15 60 85 
Contemporaneous 1.5 80 60 50 
DnD 0.5 15 35 25 
 
While all three of these invariance restrictions are rejected in the pre-2006 
years, the existing literature consistently applies these models, especially the 
DnD and before-after invariance models. Thus, researchers are assuming that the 
invariance restrictions apply when the outcomes are counterfactual even though 
they are rejected in periods when the outcomes are observed. While assumptions 
that are rejected in 2000 may be valid in 2010, the literature using these invariance 
models does not explain why this might be the case when evaluating SYG laws. 
Rather, as noted above in Part I, researchers often recognize that these strong 
assumptions may have little foundation, but defend their strong assumptions as 
necessary to “provide answers.” The problem is that the strong invariance 
assumptions appear to be inaccurate and yield conflicting conclusions. 
 
 38.  The maximum differences are rounded to the nearest 0.5 for murder and nearest 5 for all other 
crimes. 
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III 
BOUNDED VARIATION ASSUMPTIONS 
In this Part, we use bounded variation assumptions developed by Manski and 
Pepper to relax the three invariance models evaluated above.39 For example, 
rather than assuming the counterfactual murder rate equals the 
contemporaneous rate from the untreated states, an assumption that is violated 
in the pre-2006 period, we will instead assume that the counterfactual rate is 
bounded between the contemporaneous rate plus and minus a constant. That is, 
treated and untreated states are assumed to be similar but not identical to each 
other. A bounded before-after variation assumption restricts the absolute 
difference in mean treatment response between two periods to be less than some 
constant. We refer to this constant as the degree of similarity and label it as “S.” 
The larger the selected value of the constant, S, the weaker the assumption. These 
bounded variation assumptions have identifying power because they imply that 
counterfactual state-year murder rates are similar to observed rates in other 
states and years. 
In Part III.A, we examine the sensitivity of inferences to different identifying 
restrictions without taking a stand on any particular bounded variation model or 
the value of the associated degree of similarity, S. Then, in Part III.B, we apply a 
specific set of bounded variation models that are consistent with the pre-2006 
crime rates. In particular, we use the results in Table 5 to define the degree of 
similarity. Under these bounded variation models, we find that SYG statutes 
increase murder and violent crimes rates, but have uncertain effects on robbery 
and assault. 
A. Sensitivity of Inferences to the Bounded Variation Assumption 
We begin by examining the sensitivity of inferences to different bounded 
variation assumptions without taking a stand on the particular value of the degree 
of similarity, S. This allows us to illustrate the sensitivity of inferences to different 
assumptions. 
Figure 2 traces out the effect of SYG statutes on average murder rates in the 
thirteen treated states for different values of S. The traditional contemporaneous 
invariance assumption, where S = 0, point-identifies the ATE, revealing that SYG 
statutes increase the average murder rate by 1.65. However, ambiguity about the 
ATE increases with S, and any value of S larger than two renders it impossible to 
sign the ATE. For example, when S = 2, the counterfactual murder rate is 
estimated to lie between [2.5, 6.5], or the counterfactual murder rate from Table 
2 +/- S. The observed murder rate for the thirteen treated states is 6.2, and the 
ATE is estimated to lie between [-0.3, 3.7]. 
Figure 2 also traces out the ATE of SYG statutes under the bounded before-
after invariance assumption. The traditional before-after invariance assumption 
(S = 0) point-identifies the ATE, revealing that the SYG statutes decrease the 
 
 39.  See generally Manski & Pepper, Right-to-Carry Laws, supra note 1. 
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average murder rate by -0.77. Uncertainty about the ATE increases with S, and 
for values of S in excess of 1, the sign of the ATE is not identified.40 Finally, 
relaxing the DnD invariance restriction even by small amounts (S ≥ 0.15) makes 
it impossible to sign the ATE. 
Rather than consider a single invariance assumption in isolation, it may be 
sensible to combine different sets of bounded variation assumptions. For 
example, one might simultaneously assume that the treated and untreated states 
are similar and that treated states had similar characteristics in the 2000–2004 and 
2008–2010 periods. Focusing on this joint model, some restrictions on the degree 
of similarity are rejected while others lead to point-identification. For example, 
it cannot be that S = 0 for both the contemporaneous and before-after bounded 
variation assumptions. To see this, examine Figure 2, which shows that the point 
estimate when S = 0 for the contemporaneous model differs from the point 
estimate when S = 0 for the before-after model. The models point-identify the 
ATE for a variety of parameter values, and identify the sign of the ATE for 
others.41 The ATE is identified to be negative for any feasible values of the degree 
of similarity such that S < 0.8 for before-after models, and greater than zero for 
any feasible value of the parameters where S < 1.7 for contemporaneous models. 
For other values of the degree of similarity, the bounds do not identify the sign 
of the ATE. 
Overall, this sensitivity analysis traces out ambiguity resulting from the 
selection problem. We find that the sign of the ATE is identified for some 
parameter values, but not others. When different bounded variation models are 
simultaneously applied, the strict invariance models are ruled out, but other 
models either point-identify the ATE or identify the sign of the ATE. Finally, for 
some parameter values, the joint model does not identify whether SYG laws 
increase or decrease murder. Clearly, as with the invariance models, the results 
are sensitive to the underlying assumptions. Next, we evaluate the impact of SYG 




 40.  For example, when S = 2, the counterfactual murder rate is estimated to lie between [4.9, 8.9], 
the observed crime rate for the thirteen treated states is 6.2, and the ATE is estimated to lie between [-
2.7, 1.3]. 
 41.  For example, when S = 1.2 for both models, the ATE is identified to equal 0.4, and when S = 0.1 
for the bounded time variation models and 2.3 for the geographic variation models, the ATE is identified 
to equal -0.7. 
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Figure 2. Bounds on the ATE of Murder Rates Under Different Models and S42 
 
B. Estimates of the Effect of SYG Laws on Bounded Variation Assumptions 
Following Manski and Pepper,43 we use the pre-treatment period to generate 
data-based degree of similarity parameters, S, for each bounded variation model. 
In particular, we use the estimates derived using the pre-2006 data displayed in 
Table 5. These values of S ensure the bounded variation models are consistent 
with the observed pre-2006 data. So, for murder, a before-after parameter S of 
1.0 ensures that the bounded invariance model is consistent with the pre-2006 
murder rate data. The analogous parameters for the contemporaneous model is 
1.5 and for the DnD model is 0.5. 
Table 6 displays the results for the three bounded-variation models discussed 
in this Article, first considering the three assumptions separately and then 
combining the assumptions. When the bounded variation models are applied 
separately, the estimates do not generally identify the sign of the ATE. There 
are, however, several notable exceptions. For violent crime rates, the ATE is 
estimated to be positive under the contemporaneous and DnD bounded variation 
models. Under these models, we estimate that the SYG statutes increase average 
violent crime rates by at least two and by as much as 103. For murder, the ATE 
is estimated to increase by at least 0.2 and at most 3.2 under the contemporaneous 
model. 
To narrow the bounds, we combine the three bounded variation assumptions. 
Under this joint bounded variation model, the sign of the ATE is not identified 
for robbery and assault. The estimated bounds imply that SYG laws might lead 
 
 42.  In this Figure, LB ≡ lower bound; UB ≡ upper bound; C ≡ contemporaneous restriction; and BA 
≡ before-after restriction. 
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the robbery rate to fall by as much as -6 or increase by as much as 11. For the 
assault rate, the data and models imply that effect of SYG laws lies between -4 
and 33. Without stronger assumptions, we cannot determine whether SYG laws 
increase or decrease the expected rates of robbery or assault. 
However, under this joint bounded variation model, we estimate that SYG 
laws increase violent crime and murder. In particular, SYG are estimated to 
increase the expected murder rate by 0.2, and the violent crime rate by between 
3 and 50. This implies that SYG laws increase the murder rate by 3 percent (from 
6.0 to 6.2) and the violent crime rate by at least 1 percent and as much as 13 
percent. Thus, under this weak bounded variation model, SYG laws are 
estimated to have a modest positive effect on the average murder and violent 
crime rates. Cheng and Hoekstra,  who use a DnD invariance assumption, draw 
similar conclusions.44 In particular, they find SYG laws do not have a statistically 
significant effect on burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault, but do have a 
positive effect of 8% on murder.45 
Table 6. Estimated Treatment Effect Under Different Bounded Variation Models 
 Murder Robbery Assault Violent Crime 
Before-After [-1.8, 0.2] [-19. 11] [-87, 33] [-120, 50] 
Contemporaneous [0.2, 3.2] [-94, 67] [-4, 116] [ 3, 103] 
DnD [-0.6, 0.4] [-6, 24] [-17, 53] [2, 52] 
DnD + 
Contemporaneous 
[0.2, 0.4] [-6, 24] [-4, 53] [3, 52] 
DnD +  
Before-After 
[-0.6, 0.2] [-6, 11] [-17, 33] [2, 50] 
All Three Models [0.2, 0.2] [-6, 11] [-4, 33] [3, 50] 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Providing credible estimates of the impact of gun laws on crime has proven 
to be a difficult undertaking. Despite a large empirical literature, research has 
failed to reach consensus about the impact of different gun laws on crime.46 
Empirical results vary with the data and are highly sensitive to minor variation in 
the model assumptions. 
In this Article, we make transparent how assumptions shape inference, 
focusing on the impact of SYG laws on crime rates. These assumptions can affect 
the credibility of studies claiming an impact on violence relating to SYG laws. 
After illustrating how the empirical findings are sensitive to commonly used 
invariance assumptions, we then apply the recent methods developed by Manski 
and Pepper to assess what can be inferred under relatively weak assumptions 
restricting variation in treatment response across geography and time. These 
partial identification models highlight the inherent tradeoff between the strength 
and credibility of assumptions and findings. Strong invariance assumptions lead 
 
 44.  See generally Cheng & Hoekstra, supra note 2. 
 45.  Id. at 839. 
 46.  See supra note 1. 
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to definitive findings that may lack credibility. Weaker bounded variation 
assumptions can lead to uncertain but credible findings. 
By assessing the effect of SYG laws using the bounded variation 
assumptions, we illustrate the sensitivity of inferences to underlying 
assumptions. Under the weakest assumptions, the bounds are wide and cannot 
reveal whether SYG laws increase or decrease violent crimes. But under our 
preferred joint bounded invariance model, we find evidence that SYG laws have 
uncertain effects on assault and robbery but lead to a modest increase in violent 
crime and murder. 
 
